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Introduction
“The devil is in the detail, and we’re try-
ing to get to grips with this devil…”2, the 
words of Michel Platini, President of the 
Union of European Football Associations 
(“UEFA”), in August 2013, commenting 
on UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regula-
tions (“the Regulations”). The intention 
of the Regulations is simple: an attempt to 
restore financial prudence in the operation 
of the biggest European football clubs. 
The details of how the Regulations can 
achieve this are complex. This article will 
explain the “devilish detail” through an 
analysis of how UEFA, for the first time 
in 2014, begins the process of enforce-
ment of the Regulations. The article will 
consider why the Regulations were intro-
duced, the likely impact they will have on 
top flight European football clubs and the 
likelihood of a legal challenge to them. 
Background to FFP Regulations
Financial overspending by sports’ clubs is 
not limited to football clubs, but the most 
egregious examples of financial reckless-
ness over the years have occurred within 
the ranks of top flight European football 
clubs. The collapse of one of Europe’s pre-
eminent football clubs Glasgow Rangers 
FC in 2012 illustrates that no football club 
is too big to suffer financial disaster. Com-
menting on this case a select committee of 
the House of Commons, the lower House 
of the UK Parliament, commented that it 
was “a powerful example of the excesses 
of professional clubs in competing with 
one another, and the consequences for 
their community when mismanagement 
leads to financial collapse”.3  
For decades, top flight European football 
has experienced the curious phenomenon 
of rising income based on the sport’s grow-
ing popularity, coupled with increasing 
financial losses. According to the UEFA 
Benchmarking Report for the financial 
year 20114, the income of the clubs play-
ing in the top divisions of the European 
countries had grown over the previous 
five years by an average annual amount 
of 5.6% (more than ten times the average 
rate of growth of the economies of these 
countries), to a total of € 13.2 billion. The 
total revenues (excluding transfer fees) of 
the “big five” leagues doubled from € 4.2 
billion to € 8.4 billion (reflecting partly the 
increased value of the broadcasting deals 
secured for television rights). 
Meanwhile, Deloitte’s published fig-
ures for the first decade of the twenty-
first century5 show that, while there has 
been steady growth in income terms of 
the top flight clubs in Europe, aggregate 
net losses of these clubs has tripled since 
2007 to reach € 1.7 billion, with 63% of 
the clubs operating at a loss in 2011. The 
major contributing factor to the losses has 
been the increased spending by clubs bid-
ding against one another to attract a small 
global pool of the most talented players, 
in an attempt to engineer success on the 
pitch. Muller, Lammett and Hovemann6 
provide an excellent analysis of the “rat 
race” engaged in by the top clubs all aspir-
ing to partake in the most lucrative com-
petitions by buying success in the shape 
of exponentially growing transfer fees. 
Gambling on success in this way inevita-
bly produces losers as well as winners in a 
financial sense. 
Although sporting fiscal irresponsibility 
is not unique to European football, it has 
become in recent years a growing problem 
in the sport. In April 2014, it was revealed 
in the Global Sports Salaries Survey 2014, 
compiled by the Sportingintelligence 
website and ESPN The Magazine, that the 
English Premiership club Manchester City 
FC now tops the global wages league for 
athletes, with the average first team player 
at the club now paid £ 5.3 million a year 
(£ 102,653 a week). Second on the list are 
the New York Yankees, and also appearing 
on the list of the top twelve highest paying 
wage earners are the major European foot-
ball clubs Real Madrid FC, Barcelona FC, 
Bayern München FC, Manchester United 
FC, Chelsea FC and Arsenal FC.7 
The reason for the presence of many 
English football clubs in this list is that 
entrance into the English Premiership 
League (“EPL”) is considered the most lu-
crative move in world sport, with the latest 
television rights for the period 2013-2016 
concluded by the Premiership on behalf of 
these elite 20 clubs at £ 3.018 billion, a rise 
of 70% over the previous deal. Wealthy 
individuals, “sugar-daddy ownership” in 
Lang’s phrase8, tempted by the prestige 
the EPL offers, buy up clubs, and spend 
extraordinary amounts of money to buy 
success. It has been reported that Sheikh 
Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan of Abu 
Dhabi has invested over five years £ 1 bil-
lion in Manchester City FC, just slightly 
more than Roman Abramovich, the Rus-
sian oligarch, has invested in Chelsea FC 
since 2003. Wealthy owners of clubs in the 
league below the Premiership, the Foot-
ball League Championship, go to simi-
larly extraordinary lengths to buy a place 
in the wealthiest league in world football; 
a good example being Cardiff City FC. 
Cardiff obtained promotion into the EPL 
at the end of the 2012-2013 season at a 
huge cost. Accounts filed at Companies 
House for the year ending 31 May 2013 
reported an operating loss of £ 30.9 mil-
lion up from £ 13 million in the previous 
season. Wages and salaries accounted for 
£ 27 million compared to £ 18.5 million in 
the previous year. The BBC reported Car-
diff’s Chairman Mehmet Dalman admitt-
ting that Malaysian businessman Vincent 
Tan had invested £ 150 million in the club 
since 2010.9 
The Regulations’ objective is to bring fi-
nancial order back into European football. 
Theoretical justifications for the FFP 
Regulations
Muller, Lammett and Hovemann10 sum-
marise that ““la crème de la crème” of 
7© Nolot June 2014
European football includes a string of 
clubs with significantly loss-making busi-
ness models that in “normal” industries, 
where profitability is the criterion for sur-
vival, would fall into bankruptcy”. They 
refer to the practice of wealthy business-
men bankrolling topflight football clubs as 
“financial doping”. They argue that there 
is a theoretical justification for a sporting 
regulatory body (in this case UEFA) to 
step in and control the extent of financial 
aid being used to buy sporting success. 
They argue that allowing sporting success 
to be controlled by off the pitch compe-
tition to attract the richest “sugar daddy” 
is a violation of sporting ethical standards 
and the spirit of the competition.
Dietl, Franck and Lang11 cite some of the 
characteristics specific to the football in-
dustry that tend to increase expenditure 
by wealthy owners above and beyond 
what would be the case assuming rational 
behaviour and a profit-maximising clubs 
(what Franck calls the phenomenon of 
overinvestment through revenue dissipa-
tion): a strong connection between invest-
ment in players and on field success; an 
“additional exogenous prize” (e.g., UEFA 
Champions League qualification); and a 
system of promotion and relegation with 
a large financial impact attached. 
Franck says that the term “arms race” is 
not really strong enough to describe the 
extreme amounts invested and hence huge 
losses incurred in top flight European foot-
ball; he refers instead to a “zombie race”12, 
and refers to the literature on the “too big 
to fail” phenomenon13. Van Rompuy14 has 
calculated that, as of September 2012, 
Spanish football clubs owed the State a 
combined € 1.3 billion in taxes and social 
security. There is an expectation that the 
State will not pull the plug as too much 
cultural, communal and emotional invest-
ment is invested by the Spanish people in 
football. 
It is not just commentators who have 
called for new regulations to restore great-
er solvency in top flight football clubs. The 
clubs themselves cooperated with UEFA 
in drafting the Regulations, and legisla-
tors too have expressed disquiet with the 
financial culture in football. For example, 
the UK Parliament (more specifically the 
House of Commons Department for Cul-
ture, Media and Sport select committee) 
has undertaken two recent enquiries into 
football governance in the UK, including a 
review of the so-called Football Creditors 
rule15. Under this rule, EPL and Football 
League clubs have to pay football credi-
tors before other creditors or face expul-
sion from the League (which would nor-
mally lead to the club’s dissolution). In its 
latest report, the committee recommended 
bringing forward legislation to outlaw 
the rule which it branded “immoral”, but 
has recommended delaying any new law 
until the Financial Fair Play rules, which 
have been introduced into English football 
(based on, but a variation of, the Regula-
tions), have been allowed to work and are 
tested.
Football’s regulators were keen, therefore, 
to bring in rules to attempt to curb the in-
creasing overspending by clubs; but critics 
have been quick to assert that the Regula-
tions infringe European competition law. 
Further to the well-known ground break-
ing decision of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (as it is now known) in 
Bosman16, rules and regulations of sports 
governing bodies must comply, where the 
rules have an economic impact which ob-
viously the Regulations do, with European 
Union law, for example competition law, 
contained in art. 101 and 102 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Un-
ion. 
In an attempt to analyse the probable ef-
fect of the Regulations on competition, 
the Regulations have been the subject of 
several academic economic studies. An 
economic modelling based on the impact 
of the Regulations by Madden17 concludes 
that “the imposition of FFP makes all par-
ties (fans, owners and players) worse off, 
primarily because of the adverse impact 
it has on all team and league qualities”. 
Madden argues that the Regulations will 
deny clubs the benefits accruing from sub-
stantial injections of external money. 
Peeters and Szymanski18 conclude that 
the net result of the Regulations over time 
will be a fall in the wage to turnover ratio 
of clubs. They go so far as to characterise 
the Regulations as a form of horizontal re-
striction on competition. Vopel and Sass19 
argue that under the Regulations it will 
be more difficult to build up a new team, 
thereby consolidating the position of the 
current top teams, in effect thereby creat-
ing a “barrier to entry” to the top table of 
clubs by aspiring newcomers who will be 
restricted from taking the route of clubs 
such as Manchester City FC and Chelsea 
FC and buying success.
Franck20 posits the contrary view, con-
cluding that when clubs can no longer rely 
on large scale cash injections to buy new 
(and better) players “restoring efficient 
managerial incentives” will result in a 
better brand of management. “The time for 
repeated managerial moral hazard and 
rent-seeking games in European football 
is over if FFP comes into action. Foot-
ball managers will have to concentrate on 
productive efforts to develop the football 
business as a whole and in a sustainable 
way instead of focusing on “payroll-gam-
bling” in a sort of “football casino” .”21 
The Regulations: in brief
The Regulations were introduced in 2011 
as an extension to UEFA’s existing club 
licensing system. The principal objectives 
of the Regulations are defined in art. 2.2 
as follows:
“a to improve the economic and finan-
cial capability of the clubs, increasing 
their transparency and credibility;
b to place the necessary importance on 
the protection of creditors and to en-
sure that clubs settle their liabilities 
with players, social/tax authorities 
and other clubs punctually;
c to introduce more discipline and ra-
tionality in club football finances;
d to encourage clubs to operate on the 
basis of their own revenues;
e to encourage responsible spending for 
the long-term benefit of football;
f to protect the long-term viability and 
sustainability of European club foot-
ball.”
Michel Platini has stated that the introduc-
tion of the “financial fair play concept”:
“…should not be seen as a call for aus-
terity and a return to the budgets of old. 
Football moves impressive amounts of 
money and that is a good thing. Nor is 
it a question of seeking a utopian dis-
tribution of wealth. There have always 
been clubs that are richer than others 
and there doubtless always will be. All 
we want is for clubs – richer and poorer 
alike – to spend no more than they earn 
and to balance their books, this being 
the only sure way for them to survive.”
There is a requirement under the Regu-
lations, in the words of the explanatory 
document on UEFA’s website22, for clubs 
to prove that they:
“do not have overdue payables towards 
other clubs, their players and social/
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tax authorities throughout the season. 
In other words, they have to prove they 
have paid their bills.” 
The other rule introduced by the Regula-
tions is the “break-even” rule, which is 
the focus of this article. Sanctions for this 
rule have effect from the 2013-2014 sea-
son, and it is a requirement for clubs to 
balance their books over the two preced-
ing years (increasing to three years from 
2014-2015) between income from football 
related activities and expenditure (for ex-
ample players’ wages and transfer fees). 
Art. 58.1 of the Regulations states:
“Relevant income is defined as revenue 
from gate receipts, broadcasting rights, 
sponsorship and advertising, commer-
cial activities and other operating in-
come, plus either profit on disposal of 
player registrations or income from dis-
posal of player registrations, excess pro-
ceeds on disposal of tangible fixed assets 
and finance income. It does not include 
any non-monetary items or certain in-
come from non-football operations.” 
The break-even rule is subject to a number 
of exceptions: 
– exemptions for expenditure on stadia/
training grounds and development of 
youth  sections/academies; 
– contracts with players signed before 
2010 are not included (for the first two  
seasons under consideration);
– an “acceptable deviation” is possible, 
currently € 5 million over the previous 
two  years, or up to € 45 million if the 
shortfall is covered by equity invest-
ment (i.e.  subsidy by a wealthy 
owner), reducing from 2015-2016 to € 5 
million or € 30  million (equity) over 
the previous three seasons.
One potentially complex area of the Regu-
lations, which is discussed further below 
in the context of specific clubs such as 
Manchester City FC and Paris St Germain 
FC, is how the break-even rule is affected 
by sponsorship of a club by a party related 
to the club’s owner(s). In essence only 
to the extent that the sponsorship repre-
sents good value based on a hypothetical 
“arm’s-length” transaction can it count to-
wards income. UEFA’s description of the 
rule is as follows:
“If a club’s owner injects money into the 
club through a sponsorship deal with a  
company to which he is related, then 
UEFA’s competent bodies will investi-
gate and, if necessary, adapt the calcu-
lations of the break-even result for the 
sponsorship revenues to the level which 
is appropriate (“fair value”) according 
to market prices.”23 
The overall intention of the break-even 
rule is to limit the amount of financial as-
sistance a wealthy individual can extend to 
a club, in other words to restrict “financial 
doping” and the role of the “sugar daddy”. 
Competition on the field, rather than com-
petition off it to secure a wealthy backer 
should determine clubs’ success under the 
Regulations.
The Regulations bind all clubs eligible for 
competition in UEFA’s European compe-
titions, the Champions League (in which 
the previous season’s higher placed clubs 
in the highest domestic divisions in each 
European country compete) and the Eu-
ropa League, for the second tier of best 
performing clubs. 
A club taking part in a European compe-
tition must submit the required licensing 
documentation to their national football 
association. Investigation into compliance 
with the Regulations can be requested 
by UEFA’s Club Financial Control Panel 
(“CFCP”), who have the power to con-
duct audits of the clubs in order to verify 
whether the correct licensing decision 
was reached by the domestic association, 
and if necessary impose sanctions. These 
sanctions are various and at the discre-
tion of UEFA, the most serious sanction 
being a ban on a club from taking part in 
the Champions League, which if applied 
would naturally have very significant fi-
nancial consequences for a club (under the 
latest broadcasting deal for UK TV rights 
for Champions League and Europa League 
matches BT Sport has agreed an exclusive 
deal with UEFA worth £ 897 million over 
three years from 2015-2016 season; and 
currently each of the 32 clubs participat-
ing in the Champions League group stages 
receives £ 7 million plus £ 396,000 each 
match played).24 Other, lesser, sanctions 
that UEFA may impose for a breach of 
the Regulations include fines and points 
deductions, and prevention of registration 
of new players for UEFA competitions or 
a reduction in the squad size permitted for 
a European competition. UEFA’s general 
secretary, Gianni Infantino, has stated:
“We would bar clubs in breach of the 
rules from playing in the Champions 
League or the Europa League. Other-
wise, we lose all credibility.” 25 
UEFA has already shown its resolve, 
through imposition of tough sanctions 
(fines and exclusion from UEFA competi-
tions) against Turkish clubs Besiktas and 
Bursaspor, and Hungarian club Gyori for 
breach of the other aspect of the Regula-
tions, failing to pay creditors as debts fall 
due (decisions upheld by CAS). However, 
these clubs are not the top flight clubs that 
fall under the scrutiny of the break-even 
element of the Regulations.
As stated above, the Regulations have 
led to individual member country asso-
ciations, for example the Football As-
sociation, football’s governing body in 
England, agreeing their own version of Fi-
nancial Fair Play Regulations for the EPL 
and separately for the Football League.
Spotlight on the Manchester City FC 
and Etihad Airways relationship and 
the case of Paris St Germain FC
Following UEFA’s announcement by its 
General Secretary, Gianni Infantino, earli-
er in 2014, that 76 clubs, almost a third of 
the total 237 involved in European compe-
titions, were being investigated by UEFA 
on suspicion of contravention of the Reg-
ulations, Alasdair Bell, UEFA’s legal af-
fairs director, commented that UEFA was 
expecting legal challenges to be made by 
clubs but articulated UEFA’s stomach for 
the fight: “We are not afraid of [UEFA de-
cisions] being contested,” Bell said. “We 
fully anticipate there will be challenges – 
it would be strange if there weren’t. July 
and August could be a busy time.”26 Mr 
Bell added that any clubs exceeding the 
break-even requirements by more than 
20% faced the strictest sanctions of with-
drawal of up to five players from their 25 
strong UEFA competition squads with re-
peat offenders facing outright disqualifi-
cation the following season.27 
Two clubs in particular, Manchester City 
FC and Paris St Germain FC, were high-
lighted in media reports in early 2014 
as significantly non-compliant with the 
Regulations. In the case of both clubs the 
spotlight has been on sponsorship deals by 
parties related to the owners, which under 
the Regulations, as discussed above, must 
be assessed in terms of their “fair value” 
in order for the income to count towards 
balancing the clubs’ books. In 2011, a 
multi million pound sponsorship and nam-
ing deal was agreed between Manchester 
City FC and Etihad Airways, owned by 
the Abu Dhabi government, whose ruler 
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Sheikh Khalifa is the brother of Man-
chester City’s owner, Sheik Mansour. At a 
conservative estimate, the deal is reputed 
to be worth £ 350 million over 10 years. 
In the case of Paris St Germain FC, a £ 
167 million a year contract with the Qatar 
Tourism Authority attracted the scrutiny 
of UEFA’s Club Financial Control Panel.
Manchester City FC’s 2010-2011 accounts 
announced a loss of £ 99 million and the 
players’ wages bill stood at the unfeasibly 
high level of 114% of its turnover; while 
around the same time Paris St Germain 
spent £ 127 million on recruiting some of 
the sport’s global superstars, Ibrahimovic, 
Silva and Lavezzi. Manchester City FC’s 
2012-2013 accounts showed a loss of £ 
52 million and represented a slight im-
provement, but this was largely down to 
a deal selling the players’ image rights for 
£ 47 million, which many have criticised 
as creative accounting designed to work 
around the Regulations.28 Manchester City 
FC’s 2012-2013 accounts were published 
in January 2014, four months before the 
CFCP’s anticipated announcement, due in 
May 2014, regarding breaches of the Reg-
ulations. Khaldoon Al-Mubarak, chairman 
of Manchester City, was quoted as saying,
“I am very comfortable, very confident 
with our financial operation and our un-
derstanding of the UEFA rules.”29
As has been stated, the Regulations pro-
vide at art. 58 to 63 that, under the break-
even requirement, the only income that 
counts is pure footballing or “operating 
income”, in effect, gate receipts, revenue 
from broadcasting deals and sponsorship. 
It is commonly accepted that sponsorship 
is footballing or operating income as it re-
lates to payment for the goodwill arising 
from the footballing activities of the club. 
As Nixon30 points out, such sponsorship 
income is quite different to income from a 
side-line business, such as hotel or proper-
ty purchases, which could not be included 
in a club’s operating income. And yet, the 
Etihad sponsorship, which included nam-
ing rights for Manchester City FC’s sta-
dium, was perceived by many as a strategy 
for circumventing the break-even rule. 
When compared, however, to sponsorship 
and naming rights secured by other large 
clubs, Manchester City FC argued that the 
sponsorship was “fair value”. 
To determine this question, the issues to 
be decided by UEFA’s Club Financial 
Control Panel are as follows:
1 Is the sponsorship a related party trans-
action (“RPT”)?
2 If so, is the deal concluded on a “fair 
value”? To answer this the Panel would 
need to break down the deal into its con-
stituent parts, as the sponsorship cov-
ered three separate elements and did not 
specify their respective proportions:
a (re)naming rights for the Etihad sta-
dium;
b shirt sponsorship; and
c development of the Etihad campus.
A benchmarking exercise would be 
required to apportion the three strands 
of the deal, and comparators would then 
need to be sought, in relation to e.g. 
shirt sponsorship deals. This exercise 
is, of course, fraught with difficulty. 
So many imponderables are present. 
The benchmarking exercise would 
need to posit the chances of the club 
competing in the highest competitions 
(e.g. the Champions League) in future 
years, since this would affect the 
club’s goodwill on which the value 
of the sponsorship deal is predicated; 
and in the case of a long fixed term 
deal, such as Manchester City FC’s, 
an estimate would need to be taken of 
the commercial value of the deal in 
ten years time; clubs would no doubt 
point to the exponentially growing TV 
deals etc., to justify long term deals 
which may appear in the short term as 
excessive. The imponderables make the 
sport’s core commercial currency, and 
hence the “fair value” of sponsorship 
deals very difficult to value. 
RPTs are dealt with at Annex X, section 
E of the Regulations at pages 83ff.31 The 
relevant part is at Annex X (E.2), which 
states:
“2 A person or a close member of 
that person’s family is related to a 
reporting entity if that person:
a has control or joint control over 
the reporting entity;
b has significant influence over the 
reporting entity; or
c is a member of the key manage-
ment personnel of the report-
ing entity or of a parent of the 
reporting entity.”
It can be seen that terms such as “signifi-
cant influence” and to a lesser extent “key 
management personnel” are terms of art 
rather than science. Given the enormous 
amounts of money involved, it is highly 
foreseeable that clubs will have spent con-
siderable amounts on legal fees already 
negotiating with UEFA’s CFCP the effect 
of these words.
Obviously, only if the sponsorship is a Re-
lated Party Transaction (“RPT”) need the 
issue of “fair value” be addressed. In rela-
tion to this question Annex X (E.7) of the 
Regulations state: 
“A related party transaction may, or 
may not, have taken place at fair value 
[...] An arrangement or a transaction 
is deemed to be “not transacted on an 
arm’s length basis” if it has been en-
tered into on terms more favourable to 
either party to the arrangement than 
would have been obtained if there had 
been no related party relationship.”
In reality, UEFA’s CFCP might well invert 
the questions and first assess whether a 
sponsorship deal represents fair value be-
fore addressing the first question, i.e is it 
a RPT? Of course the two are linked be-
cause, if “fair value” is not present, then 
surely this is evidence of a RPT?
In May 2014, it was widely reported that 
nine clubs had agreed to accept sanctions 
for breach of the break-even requirement 
of the Regulations. Both Manchester City 
FC and Paris St Germain FC were report-
edly facing fines (€ 60 million over three 
years) and a reduction in squad size (25 
to 21) for European competitions, coupled 
with a cap on their wage bill. Failure to 
agree the sanction by either club would 
mean the matter being passed to the Club 
Financial Control Body’s Adjudicatory 
Chamber, chaired by the Portuguese judge 
José Narciso da Cunha Rodrigues, lead-
ing potentially to an even harsher punish-
ment, such as exclusion from the Cham-
pions League. The Court of Arbitration 
for Sport would hear any appeal from that 
body over the summer so as to minimise 
disruption to the 2014-2015 season.
The Regulations provide for a challenge 
within ten days of a formal sanction being 
imposed by any other club on the grounds 
that the sanction is unfair (i.e. not harsh 
enough). However, any argument by a 
rival club that a Champions League ban 
should be the consequence of a breach 
is counter-productive as it would dimin-
ish the brand if the biggest clubs are in-
eligible, and it ignores how complex the 
Regulations are. Arsène Wenger’s32 call 
10 © NolotJune 2014
for clubs to be banned where they breach 
the Regulations: “You would think that 
you accept the rules and you’re in the 
competition, or you don’t accept the rules 
and you’re not in the competition” might 
be ascribed to gamesmanship.33 
Can the Regulations have an impact 
and will they withstand any legal 
challenge?
The Guardian newspaper’s review of all 
EPL club accounts for the 2012-2013 
season, published on 1 May 201434, con-
cludes that clubs paid their players and 
other staff a record £ 1.8 billion in 2012-
2013, up 11% on the previous year; and 
that, despite a combined income of £ 2.7 
billion, the clubs as a whole made an ag-
gregate loss of £ 291 million. With five 
clubs losing £ 50 million or more (Aston 
Villa, Chelsea, Liverpool, Manchester 
City and Queens Park Rangers) twelve 
of the twenty clubs made a loss in 2012-
2013. The report concluded that the EPL 
clubs’ net debt increased to £ 2.4 billion 
in 2012-2013, from £ 2.2 billion in 2011-
2012. This analysis obviously calls into 
question the impact that the Regulations 
have made to date, at least in the EPL. 
Not surprisingly, UEFA’s take on its own 
“Club Benchmarking Report: 2013/14 
season”35 was more upbeat in regard to 
the signs that the Regulations were begin-
ning to make a positive impact on club 
solvency. It remains to be seen whether 
actual sanctions for breach of the Regu-
lations will engender any change in the 
overspending culture. 
The European Commission supports the 
Regulations; however, this is no guaran-
tee that the Regulations’ legality would 
be upheld in court. Jean-Louis Dupont 
(the lawyer who sucessfully represented 
Bosman) is instructed by player’s agent 
Daniel Striani in a claim before the Euro-
pean Court, commenced in 2013, seeking 
a declaration under art. 101 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union 
that the Regulations infringe EU compe-
tition law as they create “a barrier to en-
try”, and consolidate the position at the 
top of the table of the existing top clubs, 
as well as depressing the wages of foot-
ballers (and of course their agents). It was 
also reported in February 2014 that Shaun 
Harvey, the Chief Executive of the Foot-
ball League (representing the three high-
est divisions in English football behind the 
EPL), had written to all Football League 
clubs promising to maintain the Football 
League’s own FFP rules:
“The League has received a letter from 
Brabners solicitors on behalf of sev-
eral unnamed Championship (and one 
League One) clubs which raises a num-
ber of issues including the potential of a 
legal challenge.”36 
Paragraph 4.7 of the Commission’s 2007 
White Paper on Sport,37 acknowledges ro-
bust licensing systems as a “tool for pro-
moting good governance in sport”; and 
UEFA, of course, argue that the Regula-
tions, in seeking to curb excessive debt, 
represent good governance. The question 
for the Court would be whether the Regu-
lations represent a proportionate way of 
achieving the outcome of greater fiscal 
prudence. Other measures that might have 
been followed to introduce better financial 
control would include salary caps, as is the 
case in cricket in both the Indian Premier 
League and English professional cricket, 
and, indeed, in the EPL’s own Financial 
Fair Play Regulations ratified in April 
2013. Critics of the Regulations have ar-
gued that the focus on “over generous” 
backers is wrong and that the Regulations 
completely ignore the more serious issue 
of owners of clubs, such as Portsmouth 
FC, Birmingham City FC and Manchester 
United FC, unscrupulously using clubs for 
their own financial ends.38 
Conclusions
UEFA have worked closely with the clubs, 
both in introducing the rules, and in im-
plementing them for the first time in May 
2014. In 2010, Michel Platini, President 
of UEFA, worked with the European Club 
Association in drafting the Regulations 
and accepted changes to them at their in-
stigation. 
The Regulations contain a “settlement” 
option allowing individual clubs ten days 
to negotiate the finding of the CFCP. The 
choice of a fine (€ 60 million over three 
years) and reduction in squad size (25 to 
21) for European competitions coupled 
with a cap on the wage bill as a penalty for 
Manchester City FC and Paris St Germain 
FC is an indication that the Regulations 
are to be implemented gradually. 
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